The writer is an economist, anchor, geopolitical analyst and the President of All Pakistan Private Schools’ Federation, president@Pakistanprivateschools.com
The one-line bulletin from Iranian state television on Monday – that Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey and Iran “agreed to continue discussions to strengthen cooperation… including on regional peace and security” after a first meeting in Tehran – may look routine. In the shadowed chambers of Tehran on October 26, a rare and calculated gesture unfolded that may redefine the Middle East’s precarious balance: senior officials from the Makkah Pact—Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman, Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir, and Turkey’s intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin—sat across from Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei. This was no routine diplomatic courtesy. For the first time since the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement bound Riyadh, Islamabad, and Ankara in mutual commitment, the alliance’s heavyweights crossed into Iran for extended talks aimed at de-escalation amid intensifying Houthi strikes on Saudi soil and the looming spectre of renewed full-scale confrontation between Iran, the United States, and Israel. Inviting Tehran into this dialogue represents Riyadh’s boldest gamble yet—staking hard-won regional leverage and alliance credibility against the urgent need to contain a conflict that already threatens energy arteries, global markets, and the fragile post-war calm. Why Tehran, and why now? Because the alternative—spiralling proxy escalation and the risk of direct great-power clash—has grown too costly for any capital to ignore. The question hanging over the joint pledge to “continue the dialogue” is whether this Tehran Handshake forges the outlines of a new regional order rooted in endogenous security, or merely delivers another carefully staged photo-op before the next round of missiles flies. It is not. It is the first time the three core members of the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement (MJDA) have sat formally in Tehran, at Iran’s invitation, to discuss collective security. Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman (brother of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman) led the Saudi side. Pakistan was represented by Field Marshal Asim Munir (Chief of Army Staff and Chief of Defence Forces), with Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi also involved. Turkey sent intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin. Iran hosted President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei. The high-stakes delegation that touched down in Tehran— representing the Makkah Defence Pact—represents a profound pivot in modern Middle Eastern geopolitics. The talks focused on de-escalation, regional security mechanisms, the fallout from the US-Israeli campaign against Iran, Houthi actions, issues around the Strait of Hormuz, and broader cooperation. Iranian state media and officials described a “very good” and “positive atmosphere,” with Pezeshkian calling for “regional unity.” The four sides agreed to keep talking to strengthen cooperation, including on peace and security. Saudi officials framed the visit as supporting mediation (notably by Qatar and Pakistan) and preventing a return to military escalation. For decades, regional security architectures were explicitly designed to isolate, contain, and counter the Islamic Republic. By bringing the core architects of the Makkah Pact face-to-face with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and security chiefs in the Iranian capital, Riyadh and its Sunni-majority partners have executed a diplomatic gamble of historic proportions. The symbolism and timing are both strategic. This occurs amid a wider regional crisis that began with US and Israeli strikes on Iran earlier in 2026, subsequently spreading to involve Saudi Arabia (via escalating Iran-backed Houthi attacks from Yemen on Saudi targets, including airports and cities) and raising fears of a renewed full-scale US-Iran confrontation. The meeting produced no binding agreements or concrete deals—only a joint commitment to continue dialogue on regional peace, security, and cooperation—but it carries symbolic and strategic weight on the Middle East chessboard. Formed in early 2025 in Makkah, the MJDA is the first formal mutual-defence pact between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey, with observer status for several GCC states. Its charter is simple: an attack on one is considered an attack on all, with joint rapid response, intelligence sharing and defence-industrial cooperation. For decades, the security architecture of the Muslim world was fragmented – Saudi Arabia under the US umbrella, Turkey in NATO, Pakistan a non-NATO major ally, and Iran outside all frameworks. The MJDA was Riyadh’s attempt to create an autonomous Islamic security bloc that is not dependent on Washington. Three converging pressures forced this meeting: The Gaza War’s Aftermath: The 2023-2025 war exposed the total failure of existing security mechanisms. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan found themselves on the same diplomatic page but with no joint mechanism to influence outcomes. Tehran, despite being isolated, proved it could still escalate the regional theatre. Saudi-Iran Rapprochement 2.0: The China-brokered 2023 deal was transactional. This is transformational. Riyadh has realized that containment of Iran has failed; management of Iran is the only viable policy. Bringing Iran into conversation with the MJDA members is a de-risking strategy. The Afghanistan-Pakistan Border and ISIS-K: For Pakistan and Iran, the shared threat is no longer Israel or America – it is ISIS-Khorasan, Baloch militancy, and drug and arms smuggling. Both Islamabad and Tehran have suffered attacks in 2025-26 that originated from border vacuums. For Turkey, the PKK’s Iranian offshoots remain a concern. Security cooperation is no longer ideological; it is existential. Pakistan is the only country that enjoys deep military trust in all three capitals. To Saudi Arabia, Pakistan is the historic security guarantor with 1.5 million expatriates and decades of military training missions.
To Turkey, Pakistan is a brother-in-arms with joint drone production (Baykar-Karachi) and naval cooperation. To Iran, Pakistan is the only Sunni nuclear state that never joined an anti-Iran coalition and shares a 917-km border. If any country can be the bridge that prevents the MJDA from being perceived in Tehran as a Sunni-NATO, it is Pakistan. What Was Actually Agreed? The phrase “continue talks” is diplomatic code for two things: First, they failed to agree on a joint statement against Israel or on Syria. Iran wanted an explicit anti-Israel clause; Saudi Arabia and Turkey refused. Second, they succeeded in agreeing on a non-aggression framework. Sources in Tehran suggest four working groups were proposed: Joint Maritime Security in the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea. Counter-Terrorism and Border Security depend on the defence industry and Sanctions-Proof Supply Chains. De-confliction in Iraq and Syria: This is not a military alliance yet. It is a conflict-management forum. Sceptics will dismiss this as another talk shop. They are wrong. The MJDA members meeting in Tehran breaks a 45-year taboo since the Iranian Revolution – that Saudi-led security pacts must be anti-Iran. It signals that Saudi Arabia under MBS is now confident enough to define its security without an Iranian enemy as justification. For Iran, facing crippling sanctions and the threat of a renewed nuclear crisis, sitting with three Sunni military powers is a diplomatic lifeline that shows it is not isolated. For the United States and Israel, this is a headache. An Islamic security bloc that talks to Iran reduces Washington’s leverage to use Gulf states against Tehran.
Pakistan appears to have played a very vital and key convening role; Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir had visited Tehran the prior week and proposed the meeting. Field Marshal Gen Syed Asim Munir’s diplomatic outreach to bridge the Saudi-Iranian divide underscores Pakistan’s emerging role in regional geopolitics. Bringing historic rivals to the table is strategic diplomacy and a powerful message to India and Israel that Pakistan remains a consequential force in the Muslim world. Only Pakistan could do this, as no other country has this level of simultaneous strategic trust. With Saudi Arabia: Pakistan is not just an ally; it is the Kingdom’s historical security depth. The Pakistan Army has trained the Saudi military since the 1960s, thousands of Pakistani officers have served in the Kingdom, and Saudi security doctrine still considers Pakistan its ultimate conventional deterrent. When Pakistan speaks, Riyadh listens. With Turkey: The relationship has moved from brotherhood to battlefield interoperability. Joint production of MILGEM corvettes, KAAN fighter collaboration, Bayraktar drones assembled in Karachi — the Pakistan-Turkey defence partnership is now institutional. Ankara sees Islamabad as its only Muslim partner with real war-fighting experience and nuclear capability. With Iran: Despite border tensions, Pakistan is the only major Sunni power that has never joined a military coalition against Iran. Islamabad refused to join the Yemen war, refused to allow its territory to be used against Iran, and maintained border diplomacy even after the unprecedented missile exchange of January 2024. That neutrality gives Pakistan credibility in Tehran that no GCC state has. Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir is the embodiment of that triad. As Chief of Army Staff and now Field Marshal after the May 2025 crisis, he is the most powerful military interlocutor and respected in the Muslim world. What Field Marshal Munir did is classic Pakistani strategic diplomacy: He reframed the question. Instead of asking “How do we contain Iran?”, he asked “How do we ensure no external power — whether it is the US, Israel or India — can exploit the Saudi-Iranian divide to destabilise the entire Muslim bloc? Bringing historic rivals to the table in Tehran achieves three Pakistani objectives at once: Regional De-escalation: A Saudi-Iran détente directly reduces sectarian pressure inside Pakistan and secures Pakistan’s western border at a time when its eastern border remains volatile. Defence of the MJDA: By involving Iran early, Pakistan ensures the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement is not branded as an anti-Shia, anti-Iran Sunni NATO — a label that would have made it illegitimate and unsustainable. Strategic Autonomy for the Muslim World: This is the core of Munir Doctrine — that security of the Muslim world must be negotiated in Makkah and Tehran, not in Washington, Brussels or Tel Aviv. A Powerful Message to India and Israel. This is where the Tehran handshake transcends diplomacy and becomes deterrence. To India: For the last decade, New Delhi’s strategy has been to isolate Pakistan diplomatically — to portray it as a state that is irrelevant to Gulf security and dependent on the West. The sight of Pakistan sitting in Tehran as the convenor between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran demolishes that narrative. It shows that while India sells oil and technology, Pakistan still provides the security architecture. It tells New Delhi that any misadventure against Pakistan, like the May 2025 escalation, risks a response not just from Islamabad but from a wider Islamic security consensus. To Israel: Israel’s regional strategy since the Abraham Accords has been to build an anti-Iran coalition of Gulf states under US command. The MJDA meeting in Tehran signals the failure of that strategy. The Muslim world’s most capable militaries are talking to Iran about regional peace, not regime change. It tells Tel Aviv that the era of using Muslim divisions to expand its strategic depth is over. In essence, Field Marshal Munir’s outreach has reminded both capitals of a fundamental reality: Pakistan is not a peripheral state. It is the only Muslim nuclear power, with the sixth-largest army in the world, and it remains the indispensable hinge between the Arab world, Turkic world, and Persia. Pakistan did not just attend a meeting in Tehran. It convened a new regional order. And that is the real story behind the one-line bulletin on Iranian state TV. Discussions reportedly touched on ideas such as a regional non-aggression framework, halting Houthi attacks, reopening maritime routes, and possible paths back to US-Iran talks, though nuclear issues were reportedly off the table for this session. Houthi escalations (missile/drone attacks on Saudi cities and infrastructure made immediate pressure on Riyadh, since around the time of the Makkah Pact’s signing have directly threatened the kingdom. Riyadh seeks to contain this without full-scale war that could devastate its Vision 2030 economic plans, oil exports, and stability. Egypt’s reported approval of defence support for Saudi Arabia underscores the seriousness. Pact dynamics and collective leverage is it’s a mutual defence arrangement; an attack on one is treated as an attack on all. By engaging Iran jointly rather than bilaterally, the members project a united regional front while testing whether diplomacy can complement their defence cooperation. It positions the pact as a potential security actor rather than purely a military alliance. Fears of the war restarting, possibly after US midterms or Israeli elections, are high. Direct channels reduce miscalculation risks. For Riyadh, engaging Tehran, building on the 2023 China-brokered rapprochement, is a high-stakes move—its biggest diplomatic gamble in this crisis—because it risks domestic or alliance US and Israeli perceptions of softness while offering a path to calm the Houthi front and broader tensions. Iran’s incentives especially isolation from the US and Israel campaign, economic strain including blockades, Hormuz issues, and desire for endogenous, regionally owned security make dialogue attractive. Hosting the meeting boosts Tehran’s legitimacy and allows it to frame outcomes around Muslim-world unity and opposition to external intervention. Pakistan and Qatar’s roles facilitate this as a regional initiative less dependent on Western brokers. This is not a sudden thaw but a pragmatic response to shared risks of uncontrolled escalation that could draw in more players and disrupt global energy markets. It shifts the board more than a pure photo-op, but falls short of establishing a new order-yet.
The fate of this dialogue will not be decided in Tehran. It will be decided in Gaza, bab-el-mandeb strait, and in the Strait of Hormuz. If the four can manage to keep the Red Sea open and prevent regional wars, the Tehran meeting will be remembered as the start of a genuine Islamic concert of powers. If not, it will be another communiqué. But for the first time in a generation, the conversation has started – and it started in Tehran, not in Washington.
The timing of this summit is defined by acute vulnerability and the looming threat of total regional conflagration. Middle Eastern capitals are increasingly pursuing independent diplomatic paths. The symbolic and structural significance is that High-level Saudi, Pakistani, and Turkish security figures sitting with Iranian counterparts in Tehran is rare and visually powerful. It elevates the Makkah Pact from a defensive club into a diplomatic platform. Iranian officials spoke of a “new atmosphere.” It reinforces post-2023 Saudi-Iran engagement and promotes “regional solutions by regional actors,” reducing exclusive reliance on external powers. Outcomes were minimal—continued talks only. No ceasefire, Houthi restraint commitments, Hormuz deal, or non-aggression pact emerged. Hard issues like Iran’s nuclear program, alliance networks, US and Israeli positions remain unresolved. Sceptics note it could be tactical breathing room rather than strategic realignment. Ongoing Houthi attacks and mutual war warnings show the crisis is not resolved. If dialogue continues and produces tangible de-escalation, e.g., reduced regional enmity activity, maritime security understandings, it could seed a nascent regional security architecture involving these four powers. Failure or collapse back into conflict would confirm it as theatre. External actors, especially the US under Trump and Israel, will watch closely; the meeting itself signals some independent regional agency. In short, Riyadh’s decision to bring the Makkah Pact to Tehran is a calculated risk to manage immediate threats and claim a mediation role. It alters the immediate diplomatic landscape by opening sustained channels and projecting collective agency, but the “new regional order” depends on follow-through amid deep mutual distrust and external pressures. The next rounds of talks—and whether Houthi attacks ease or US-Iran dynamics shift—will determine if this handshake holds. Either the Tehran handshake a shadow of a wider war or a new regional order? The answer will not be written in Tehran. It will be written in the rubble of Gaza, in the crosshairs of the Bab-el-Mandeb, and in the narrow, oil-soaked waters of the Strait of Hormuz. If Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey and Iran can keep the Red Sea open, prevent another border war, and turn a dialogue into a deterrent, history will remember this meeting in Tehran as the moment an authentic Islamic concert of powers was born. If they fail, it will be filed away as just another communiqué. But one fact is already undeniable: for the first time in a generation, the most consequential conversation about the future of this region. Turkey and Pakistan acting in tandem with Saudi Arabia signals a multilateral Sunni heavyweight approach aimed at de-escalation before a broader war triggers economic and security catastrophe. With renewed tensions involving Washington and Israel casting a dark shadow over Gulf stability—and subsequent direct cross-border threats impacting Saudi infrastructure—Riyadh has recognised the limits of relying solely on external security guarantees. The Makkah Pact was ostensibly forged to build collective deterrence, yet its immediate soft underbelly has been exposed by continued regional friction, including unmitigated Houthi actions tied to the Yemen theatre. Riyadh realises that true deterrence against asymmetric threats requires direct diplomatic engagement with Tehran’s power centres.To dismiss the Tehran meeting as a mere diplomatic photo-op underestimates the sheer psychological and structural barrier that has just been breached. Entering the Iranian capital to institutionalise dialogue changes the optics of the entire chessboard. It signals that regional actors are tired of acting as proxies or staging grounds for superpower confrontations. However, calling it a permanent “New Regional Order” is premature. Substantive hurdles remain: Iran’s influence over regional armed forces (such as the Houthis) is being severely tested; even if Tehran agrees to terms, network fragmentation means non-state actors may continue independent escalations.
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