The writer is an economist, an anchor, and a geopolitical analyst
and the President of the All Pakistan Private Schools’ Federation
president@Pakistanprivateschools.com
The Indian government’s resolve to suspend the venerable Indus Waters Treaty has precipitated trepidation regarding an impending hydrological calamity in Pakistan. This development, subsequent to the lamentable Pahalgam terror attack, bespeaks a marked departure from India’s erstwhile policy of disentangling water-sharing from discord. India’s suspension of the treaty, concomitant with a broader diplomatic démarche, including the closure of the Attari-Wagah border and restrictions on Pakistani nationals’ travel, portends a paradigm shift in its strategic calculus vis-à-vis Pakistan. Although the immediate cessation of water flows is not forthcoming, the abrogation of long-standing constraints on hydroelectric projects along the Indus basin’s principal rivers forebodes significant repercussions for Pakistan’s agrarian and economic stability. Pakistan’s National Security Committee has denounced India’s actions as “inappropriate” and “false flag operations,” intimating a political stratagem bereft of empirical evidence. This riposte underscores Pakistan’s conviction that India’s manoeuvre contravenes international law. The World Bank, as guarantor of the treaty, may assume a pivotal role in mediating this dispute, given its historical involvement in facilitating the treaty’s provisions. India’s unilateral suspension of the treaty constitutes a prima facie breach of international law, and its legitimacy is dubious, as the treaty stipulates that neither party may suspend or terminate it without the consent of the other. This development raises fundamental questions regarding the sanctity of international agreements and India’s capacity to unilaterally abrogate treaties. The Indus Waters Treaty, an internationally recognised and guaranteed accord, stands as a testament to the importance of diplomatic concordance and mutual cooperation. The Indus Waters Treaty is a globally recognized and guaranteed treaty. If India unilaterally stops or cancels it, doubts about the validity of its other international treaties will surely arise. Article 12(4) of the agreement allowed termination only through the written consent of both India and Pakistan. In effect, a termination would have required a jointly drafted and ratified agreement. The treaty contained no provision that permitted unilateral suspension. A withdrawal from the agreement amounted to a violation. Even Article 62 of the Vienna Convention also not make it justify as it does not meet the necessary conditions. The IWT, signed in 1960 and brokered by the World Bank, governs the sharing of the Indus River system, allocating eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan. India’s action is a clear breach of global legal norms, as it bypasses the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanisms. It has been hailed as a durable framework, surviving multiple conflicts, including the wars of 1965, 1971, and 1999. The treaty establishes the Permanent Indus Commission for cooperation and dispute resolution, with mechanisms outlined in Article IX, involving neutral experts and arbitration if needed. This suspension could strain India-Pakistan relations further, impacting Pakistan’s water and agricultural sectors, and set a precedent for treaty compliance. Article XII(4) of the treaty states: “The provisions of this Treaty, or the provisions of this Treaty as modified under the provisions of Paragraph (3), shall continue in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two Governments.” This clause implies that the treaty can only be terminated through mutual agreement, with no explicit provision for unilateral suspension, confirming the absence of an exit clause, reinforcing that unilateral action is not legally permissible under the treaty. For India, the suspension might pressure Pakistan diplomatically, but it risks setting a precedent for treaty non-compliance, potentially undermining other international agreements. To assess whether India’s action aligns with international law, we turn to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), particularly Article 62, which addresses “Fundamental Change of Circumstances.” This article allows a party to invoke a fundamental change as a ground for terminating, withdrawing from, or suspending a treaty under specific conditions: Article 62(1) requires that the change was not foreseen and was essential to the parties’ consent, and under Article 62(3), it can also justify suspension. However, Article 62(2) prohibits invocation if the treaty establishes a boundary (which the IWT does not) or if the change results from the invoking party’s breach. Based on the analysis, India’s unilateral suspension of the IWT appears to violate international law. The treaty lacks provisions for such action, and while Article 62 of the VCLT provides a theoretical basis for termination, it is debatable whether the conditions (unforeseen change, essential basis, radical transformation) are met. India’s action breaches global legal norms by not adhering to the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanisms or termination procedures. The final determination would depend on legal interpretations and potentially international court rulings, but as of now, the evidence clearly leans toward a violation.
Legally, India’s unilateral suspension sits on weak ground as the IWT lacks an exit clause and proclaims perpetual validity. The 1997 UN Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses stresses the equitable and reasonable use and the no-harm rule. The question is also what will happen if India blocks Pakistani water downstream, and can it set an example upstream for China? If India tries to block the water of Pakistani rivers, it will not only be a violation of international water law but will also set a dangerous precedent. According to international law, an upstream country (like India) does not have the right to block the water of a downstream country (like Pakistan), whether the Indus Waters Treaty exists or not. If India takes such a step, it will establish a new pattern of behaviour at the regional level, which can be used as a precedent in international law. China can take advantage of this and can use the same Indian behaviour as a basis to block the water of the Brahmaputra River. The treaty has survived several wars and political tensions in the past, which further strengthens its legal and moral strength. Also, the International Courts, including the ICJ, held that ecological or political shifts do not easily justify abandoning a water treaty. India is leaning on the Vienna Convention doctrines of material breach and fundamental change of circumstances, but international jurisprudence applies these critical resource treaties. India’s obligations are paused, but its position would face challenges in any neutral forum, making renegotiation an ultimate end. If India proceeded to block Pakistani rivers, it would not only violate international water law but also introduce a perilous precedent. As prescribed under international law, an upstream nation such as India did not possess the right to hinder the flow of water to a downstream nation such as Pakistan, regardless of the existence of the Indus Waters Treaty. India’s unilateral suspension of the treaty is not only a violation of its established mechanisms, such as dispute resolution through the Permanent Indus Commission, impartial experts, or an arbitral tribunal, but also goes against the spirit of the treaty. India’s justification—Pakistan’s support for terrorism is not been justified and must be evaluated against these criteria: Unforeseen Change: Terrorism and cross-border tensions were present in 1960, given the historical conflicts. The treaty’s resilience through wars suggests it was designed to withstand such tensions, making it debatable whether this change was unforeseen. Essential Basis of Consent: The IWT is a water-sharing agreement, not a security pact. Pakistan’s alleged terrorism does not directly relate to the treaty’s core purpose, questioning whether it was an essential basis of consent. Radical Transformation: The obligations under the IWT concern water usage, not security. While terrorism may strain relations, it does not directly transform water-sharing obligations, making this condition hard to meet; Breach by Invoking Party: Article 62(2)(b) prohibits invocation if the change results from the invoking party’s breach, but here the claimed change is again not the change in the treaty itself. Given these considerations, it is clear that Article 62’s conditions are not met, and it is not a straightforward justification. India’s action is indeed a serious violation of international law, emphasising the treaty’s status as an internationally recognised agreement, the treaty cannot be exited unilaterally, and disputes must be addressed through Article IX’s mechanisms, such as the Permanent Indus Commission or arbitration. Whereas, the arbitration may offer limited recourse if India chooses not to follow the treaty, due to the legal constraints. In other words, to terminate the Indus Water Treaty, a termination agreement would have to be drafted by both states and then ratified by both. There is no unilateral “suspension” clause in the treaty. If India unilaterally stops following the treaty by giving justifications like “annulment”, “suspension”, “withdrawal”, or “cancellation”, etc., what it means is that it has decided to obstruct the flow of water to Pakistan. In other words, what India would call “annulment or withdrawal”, Pakistan would call it “violation”.
The question is what will happen if India blocks Pakistani water downstream, and can it set an example upstream for China? If India takes such a step, it will establish a new pattern of behavior at the regional level, which can be used as a precedent in international law. China can take advantage of this and can use the same Indian behavior as a basis to block the water of the Brahmaputra River.
India did an Act of War by suspending the treaty, as the suspension could have significant implications for Pakistan, which relies heavily on the Indus system for irrigation, supporting 80% of its cultivated land and 93% of its agricultural water needs. Reduced water availability could lead to lower crop yields, food shortages, and economic instability, exacerbating existing issues like groundwater depletion and limited storage capacity. India is likely to fast-track its hydroelectric ambitions. Projects such as the operational 330 MW Kishanganga Dam on the Jhelum and the 850 MW under-construction Ratle Dam on the Chenab could be redesigned to store more water—something Pakistan has strongly opposed in the past. India is also expected to prioritise the usage of eastern rivers. The Shahpurkandi Dam on the Ravi, completed in 2024, already redirects flows into Indian territory. The planned Ujh Dam on the same river could further reduce surplus water entering Pakistan. According to estimates, India lets about 9.3 billion cubic metres flow into Pakistan from its share—something New Delhi may now seek to stop. India is likely to halt regulated releases from hydro projects and suspend data sharing with Pakistan. Future inspections of Indian hydropower facilities by Pakistani officials may also be blocked. Building large dams on the Indus, Jhelum, or Chenab would take years—possibly a decade—due to the ecological and financial costs. Current projects are run-of-the-river in nature and can only influence timing, not volume. Still, the message is clear. Pakistan’s diplomatic options are narrow; Islamabad could appeal to the International Court of Justice or the Permanent Court of Arbitration. However, with India disputing their jurisdiction under the suspended treaty framework, legal remedies are uncertain. Pakistan may seek intervention from the World Bank, the original treaty broker, or look to allies like China and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Diplomatic escalation or trade retaliation are options, but Pakistan’s fragile economy limits room for manoeuvre. Despite Pakistan’s reliance, the treaty grants India rights too. It allows the development of irrigation over 13.4 lakh acres in Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh. At present, less than half that area—6.42 lakh acres—is actually irrigated. India is also permitted to store up to 3.60 million acre-feet of water from the Western Rivers. But in practice, such infrastructure is minimal, leaving these entitlements largely unutilised. Strategically, however, India’s right to build run-of-the-river dams offers it leverage. While not designed to block water entirely, these dams can temporarily delay flows—something that can be used as pressure during diplomatic flashpoints. Pakistan draws about 80 per cent of its freshwater supply from the Indus River system. Of the 16.8 crore acre-feet (CAF) of water flowing annually, only around 3.3 CAF is allocated to India. India already uses over 90 per cent of its share, while Pakistan remains highly dependent on the remaining water. This dependence runs deep. The rivers support 23 per cent of Pakistan’s agricultural water use and sustain roughly 68 per cent of its rural population. Disruptions could cut into crop production, elevate food insecurity, and worsen existing economic instability. Rural communities and provinces such as Punjab and Sindh would be hardest hit. Pakistan’s storage capacity compounds its vulnerability. Dams like Mangla and Tarbela can store just 14.4 million acre-feet—only 10 per cent of their annual entitlement. In dry years or during seasonal shifts, Pakistan has little cushion to manage shortages. The stakes are high for Pakistan. Its agriculture, power, and rural livelihoods hang in the balance. India did an act of war, as a political weapon, not a floodgate — Yet. India’s decision to suspend the IWT is less about immediate change and more about long-term leverage. It is, in essence, a geopolitical signal. By lifting treaty constraints, New Delhi has gained strategic flexibility. But for now, water will keep flowing across the border, though the rules around it are clearly changing. These rivers sustain lives, livelihoods, and landscapes across the country. Pakistan can simply not afford to let it become collateral in a political fight. Thus, the flows must continue. Not out of goodwill, but because the consequences of stopping them are too great for either country to bear. In the event of a conflict between Pakistan and India, the economic toll would be devastating, albeit asymmetrically so. Pakistan’s strategic targeting of Indian business hubs like Mumbai and Chennai would imperil foreign capital, prompting investors to flee and shattering India’s aspirations to global economic dominance. The resultant blow to India’s economy would be crippling, necessitating decades-long recovery efforts. Conversely, Pakistan’s smaller economy, though severely impacted, might recover with relative swiftness. It is imperative that India comprehends this stark reality, lest the bellicose rhetoric of its media further escalates tensions. A clear message must be conveyed: the costs of war would be catastrophic, with India poised to suffer disproportionately. The Indus and its tributaries that have sustained civilisations for thousands of years, now test the capacity of two modern nuclear-armed nations to cooperate. Yet, the lifeblood of Pakistan’s agrarian economy and societal well-being continues to flow, underscoring the imperative of sustained cooperation. As the Indus and its tributaries – ancient custodians of civilisations – intersect the destinies of two nuclear-armed nations, the forthcoming period will be a litmus test of diplomatic acumen, revealing whether prudence prevails or unilateralism precipitates an era of unprecedented uncertainty, jeopardising the most vital resource: water!