The writer is an economist, anchor, geopolitical analyst
and the President of All Pakistan Private Schools’ Federation
president@Pakistanprivateschools.com
China is seeking a greater presence in Africa to expand trade, secure resources, and enhance geopolitical influence, particularly through port investments – the strategy behind its financial deals. China’s relationship with Africa is set to deepen. It seems likely that economic benefits, such as job creation and infrastructure development, are key drivers, alongside potential military uses of ports. The evidence leans toward China’s strategy involving financial deals like the $51 billion pledge in 2024, aiming to deepen ties, though concerns about debt and sovereignty exist. China’s growing presence in Africa, especially in port developments, reflects a strategic blend of economic and geopolitical goals. Chinese firms are present in over a third of all African port developments, some of which could be used for an expanded Chinese naval presence on the continent. Chinese firms are present in over a third of Africa’s maritime trade hubs—a greater presence than anywhere else in the world. This engagement has intensified, with significant financial commitments and infrastructure projects shaping the continent’s landscape. This response explores why China is pursuing this strategy and the implications of its financial deals, offering a clear overview for understanding this complex relationship. China’s involvement in African ports is driven by economic interests, including expanding trade networks and securing access to resources like oil, minerals, and agricultural products. The “Go Out” strategy and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) facilitate this, with Chinese firms involved in 78 ports across 32 African countries, over a third of Africa’s 231 commercial ports. West Africa, with 35 ports, is a focal point due to its strategic trade routes. For example, the Lekki Deep Sea Port in Nigeria, where China holds a 54% stake and operates under a 16-year lease, exemplifies this approach, yielding $13 in trade revenue for every $1 invested. Beyond economics, China’s port strategy serves geopolitical aims, aiming to build a “strong maritime country” with “overseas strategic strongpoint” ports. These can have dual civilian and military uses, as seen with Djibouti’s Doraleh Port, hosting China’s first overseas naval base since 2017. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has conducted exercises at ports like Durban and Dar es Salaam, raising concerns about military expansion, though China denies plans for additional bases like in Walvis Bay, Namibia. President Xi Jinping’s $51 billion pledge in September 2024, announced at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), underscores this strategy, funding infrastructure and aiming for one million jobs. However, with Africa’s debt to China at $90 billion, concerns about economic dependency and sovereignty persist, highlighting the complex balance of benefits and risks. China’s deepening relationship with Africa, particularly through port developments and financial deals, reflects a multifaceted strategy combining economic, geopolitical, and diplomatic objectives. China’s engagement with Africa is not new, but its intensity has grown significantly in recent years, driven by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the “Go Out” strategy, which encourages Chinese firms to expand overseas. The continent, with its vast natural resources and growing markets, is central to China’s global ambitions. By comparison, Latin America and the Caribbean host 10 Chinese-built or operated ports, while Asian countries host 24. China’s president, Xi Jinping, pledged to deliver US$51 billion in loans, investment and aid to the continent over the next three years, as well as upgrading diplomatic ties. Beijing’s close engagement with Africa is not new. In some sites, Chinese firms dominate the entire port development enterprise from finance to construction, operations, and share ownership. Large conglomerates like China Communications Construction Corporation (CCCC) will win work as prime contractors and hand out sub-contracts to subsidiaries like the China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC). This is the case in one of West Africa’s busiest ports, Nigeria’s Lekki Deep Sea Port. CHEC did the construction and engineering, secured loan financing from the China Development Bank (CDB), and took a 54-per-cent financial stake in the port, which it operates on a 16-year lease. China gains as much as $13 in trade revenues for every $1 invested in ports. A firm holding an operating lease or concession agreement reaps not only the financial benefits of all trade passing through that port but can also control access. A pivotal moment was President Xi Jinping’s pledge of $51 billion in financial support during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in September 2024, announced, aiming to support infrastructure, trade, and job creation over three years. China’s primary economic motivation is to expand trade networks and secure access to resources critical for its industrial sector, such as oil, minerals, and agricultural products. The Africa Centre for Strategic Studies’ March 2025 report, “Mapping China’s Strategic Port Development in Africa,” highlights that Chinese firms are involved in 78 ports across 32 African countries, accounting for over a third of Africa’s 231 commercial ports. This presence is significantly higher than in Latin America (10 ports) and Asia (24 ports), with a concentration in West Africa (35 ports), followed by East Africa (17), Southern Africa (15), and North Africa (11). The economic strategy is underpinned by the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model, where Chinese companies not only build and finance ports but also operate them for extended periods. For instance, the Lekki Deep Sea Port in Nigeria, constructed by China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) and financed by the China Development Bank, sees CHEC holding a 54% stake with a 16-year lease. This model ensures long-term control and profitability, with estimates suggesting China gains $13 in trade revenue for every $1 invested, as noted in various analyses from Container News and the National Bureau of Asian Research. Other examples include Kribi Port in Cameroon (66% Chinese stake) and Lomé Port in Togo (50% stake), both strategically located on the Atlantic coast. These ports are often linked to inland infrastructure, such as railways, reducing trade costs for 16 landlocked African countries, where handling costs are 50% higher than global averages, according to PwC reports from 2018. The evidence leans toward China’s port investments serving geopolitical purposes, aligning with its Five-Year Plan (2021-2025), which outlines a “connectivity framework of six corridors, six routes, and multiple countries and ports,” with three corridors traversing Africa. This framework aims to build China into a “strong maritime country” and includes “overseas strategic strongpoint” ports, which have dual civilian and military value, leveraging “military civil fusion” strategies. A notable example is Djibouti’s Doraleh Port, where China established its first overseas naval base in 2017, extending its military reach into the Indian Ocean and Red Sea. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has conducted 55 port calls and 19 military exercises at African ports since 2000, including at Abidjan, Casablanca, Durban, and Dar es Salaam, as detailed in reports from the Centre for Maritime Strategy and the South China Morning Post. Speculation about additional bases, such as in Walvis Bay, Namibia, has been denied by China, but concerns persist, especially given the PLAN’s growing fleet of 355 warships, as noted by the Pentagon in April 2025. Seven ports are considered likely for future military use: Luanda (Angola), Doraleh (Djibouti), Mombasa (Kenya), Walvis Bay (Namibia), Lekki (Nigeria), Victoria (Seychelles), and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania). These developments raise concerns about regional stability and Africa’s potential involvement in global geopolitical rivalries, as highlighted in Africa Defence Forum articles from April 2025. The Lekki Deep Sea Port in Nigeria is a flagship project, illustrating China’s comprehensive involvement from construction to operation. CHEC’s role, backed by China Development Bank financing, exemplifies how Chinese conglomerates like China Communications Construction Corporation (CCCC) win prime contracts and subcontract to subsidiaries, ensuring control over the entire development process. Other ports, such as Kribi and Lomé, show similar patterns, with significant stakes ensuring economic and strategic influence. Djibouti’s Doraleh Port, with a 23% Chinese stake, is another critical case, serving as a logistics hub for both trade and military operations. PLA exercises at ports like Dar es Salaam involve facilities such as Kigamboni Naval Base and Ngerengere Air Force Base in Tanzania, indicating the dual-use potential of these investments.
Ultimately, the future of Sino-African relations will depend on striking a balance between economic cooperation and strategic autonomy, ensuring that Africa’s growth and development are shaped by its own priorities and values.
The Logic behind China’s Ports Strategy. China’s strategic priorities involving foreign ports are laid out in China’s Five-Year Plans. The current Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) talks about a “connectivity framework of six corridors, six routes, and multiple countries and ports” to advance Belt and Road construction. Notably, three of these six corridors run through Africa, landing in East Africa (Kenya and Tanzania), Egypt and the Suez region, and Tunisia. This reinforces the central role that the continent plays in China’s global ambitions. The Plan articulates a vision to build China into “a strong maritime country”—part of its larger rejuvenation as a Great Power. Since 1950, the first overseas trip of the year for Chinese foreign ministers has almost always been to one or more African countries. But Xi’s commitments are still sure to raise concerns in the US and other Western countries, which are competing with China for global influence. This raises concerns about China’s broader geostrategic aims with its port development and stokes Africans’ widely held aversion to being pulled into geostrategic rivalries. There is also a growing wariness against hosting more foreign bases in Africa. This underscores the mounting African and international interest in scrutinising China’s port development—and dual-use military basing—scenarios. China’s engagement with Africa is strategic as well as economic. Whether it’s gaining votes at the UN, better access to resources, or increasing the international use of its currency, China’s diplomatic relations with Africa play into its ambitions of being a major player in a multipolar world. From a purely economic perspective, Africa is a potentially lucrative market for China. With its underserved market and booming population, the scope for expansion into Africa offers huge potential for Chinese firms. This is particularly true now that the African Continental Free Trade Area (which was established in 2018) opens up the possibility of cross-border value chains developing in Africa. In terms of foreign direct investment, Chinese companies are still only the fifth-largest investors in Africa after their Dutch, French, US and UK counterparts. But their ascent has been relatively quick, and while Western companies are focused on resources and the financial sector, Chinese ones also invest heavily in construction and manufacturing. Chinese companies are major players in Africa’s construction sector, often working on projects funded by loans from Chinese banks to African governments. President Xi Jinping’s $51 billion pledge, announced in September 2024, is a cornerstone of China’s strategy, with $29.6 billion in credit lines, $9.9 billion in new investments, and smaller amounts for military aid, as reported by Al Jazeera and Bloomberg. This funding aims to support 30 infrastructure projects, including ports, and create at least one million jobs, as detailed in the Beijing Action Plan for 2025-2027. However, concerns about debt sustainability are significant, with Africa’s debt to China reaching $90 billion by September 2024, according to the George W. Bush Presidential Centre, raising fears of economic dependency and sovereignty loss. Recent developments include increased PLA military drills and naval port calls, noted in African media and policy discussions, with growing wariness against foreign bases, as seen in debates from the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies. Speculation about additional bases, such as in Gabon and Equatorial Guinea, has been reported by The Diplomat, though no concrete developments have materialised as of August 2025. China’s presence in African ports is unmatched globally, with a significantly larger footprint than in other regions. This dominance is part of a broader strategy to reshape global trade routes and enhance supply chain resilience, as analysed by the Royal United Services Institute. However, it also sparks controversy, with Western powers like the United States expressing concerns about security threats, particularly in West Africa, where many ports have hosted PLAN ships, as noted in Centre for Maritime Strategy reports from April 2025. Xi’s promised more investment in key sectors and to allow more African goods to enter China without duties. China’s support to African nations is political as well as economic. Its policy of non-interference in Africa’s internal affairs has been well received by African leaders – a sharp contrast to Western nations which have often tied their support to the respect of certain social or economic conditions. This has, in turn, bolstered China’s diplomatic influence on the continent. A good indicator of this influence is how many countries maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which the Chinese government sees as part of China’s territory. In Africa, only Eswatini has full relations with Taiwan and just a handful of other countries have representative offices. Another Chinese goal is to expand the global reach of its currency, the renminbi. Its motive here is to challenge the dominance of the US dollar, which gives America control over transactions anywhere in the world. Since the late 2000s, the People’s Bank of China has signed bilateral swap agreements with Morocco, Egypt, Nigeria a
South Africa to conduct transactions in renminbi. And China is aiming to increase the use of renminbi in official lending, both through domestic banks such as the China Development Bank and regional institutions such as the New Development Bank. Much like Africa’s western partners, China pursues both political and economic interests in its dealings with the continent. But, with Western leaders paying little attention to Africa, China doesn’t need to pursue debt-trap diplomacy to increase its influence there. It just needs to put forward a better partnership offer to gain ground. China’s pursuit of a greater presence in Africa, particularly through port developments, is driven by a combination of economic and geopolitical strategies. Economically, it seeks to expand trade, secure resources, and create dependencies, while geopolitically, it aims to project power and influence through dual-use ports. For African nations, the benefits include infrastructure development and job creation, but the risks of debt and sovereignty loss are significant. The balance between opportunity and dependency will shape the future of China-Africa relations, requiring careful navigation by African leaders to ensure sustainable development. As China deepens its investments in African ports, infrastructure, and trade, the continent stands to benefit from increased economic activity, job creation, and development. However, concerns about debt sustainability, sovereignty, and military expansion underscore the need for African leaders to navigate these relationships carefully. By understanding the nuances of China’s dual-use strategy, build-operate-transfer models, and geopolitical ambitions, African nations can better position themselves to harness the benefits of China’s engagement while mitigating potential risks. Ultimately, the future of Sino-African relations will depend on striking a balance between economic cooperation and strategic autonomy, ensuring that Africa’s growth and development are shaped by its own priorities and values.
