The writer is an economist, anchor, geopolitical analyst
and the President of All Pakistan Private Schools’ Federation
president@Pakistanprivateschools.com
In the wake of the German federal election of 2025, the Bundestag emerges as a tapestry of unparalleled fragmentation, its 630 seats a battleground of contending ideologies and shifting allegiances. At the helm of the Christian Democratic Union and its stalwart Bavarian ally, the Christian Social Union, stands Friedrich Merz, a figure of resolute ambition confronted by a labyrinthine political landscape. With an estimable 28.5% of the electorate’s favour—translating to nigh on 180 seats by the projections of February 23rd—the conservative bloc doth poised itself to claim the mantle of governance. Yet, this triumph falls far short of the 316 seats requisite for a commanding majority, casting Merz into the intricate dance of coalition-building amidst a parliament rent asunder by division. The far-right Alternative für Deutschland hath surged to a historic second place, garnering between 20 and 21% of the vote, whilst the Social Democratic Party, under the waning star of Chancellor Olaf Scholz, doth languish at a meagre 16.3%. The Greens, Die Linke, and the nascent Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance further complicate the tableau, each securing their foothold, whilst the Free Democratic Party teeters upon the precipice of oblivion. Thus, Merz, with steely gaze and measured tread, must navigate this tempestuous sea, seeking alliance amidst discord, that he might forge a government equal to the trials of a nation at the crossroads of destiny. The German federal election of 2025 has produced a Bundestag with significant fragmentation. Friedrich Merz, as the leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), faces a complex political landscape following the German federal election. With a Bundestag comprising 630 seats, a governing majority requires at least 316 seats. Given the CDU/CSU’s strong performance—projected at 28.5% of the vote, translating to approximately 180 seats based on preliminary projections—the conservatives are poised to lead the next government. However, falling well short of an outright majority, Merz must navigate coalition options amidst a fragmented parliament, ideological divides, and a shifting political consensus. Based on early projections reported on February 23, 2025, the CDU-CSU’s 28.5% yields roughly 180 seats. The far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) secured a historic second-place finish with around 20-21%, equating to approximately 126-132 seats. The Social Democratic Party (SPD), led by outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz, fell to a dismal 16.3%, yielding about 103 seats. The Greens polled at 12-14%, translating to 76-88 seats. Smaller parties like Die Linke (The Left) at 8.7% (around 55 seats) and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) at 5% (around 32 seats) have cleared the 5% threshold, while the Free Democratic Party (FDP) hovers near or below it, potentially missing out with fewer than 32 seats if it fails to secure 5%. This distribution, while subject to final results, underscores the necessity of coalition-building for Merz. The most straightforward path to a majority is a revival of the “Grand Coalition” (Große Koalition or GroKo) between the CDU-CSU and SPD. Together, their projected 180 (CDU-CSU) and 103 (SPD) seats total approximately 283—short of the 316 needed. However, slight variations in final vote shares or overhang seats (a feature of Germany’s electoral system that can increase the Bundestag’s size) could push this closer to or above the threshold. Historically, this alliance governed Germany multiple times under Angela Merkel, most recently from 2013 to 2021, offering a familiar framework. This option is politically viable due to its precedent and the shared centrist tendencies of both parties. Merz has indicated openness to working with the SPD, and despite their electoral losses, the SPD remains a pragmatic partner with experience in governance. Policy overlaps, such as support for Ukraine and moderate economic reforms, could facilitate negotiations. Additionally, both parties now appear willing to ease the “debt brake” (Schuldenbremse), a constitutional limit on borrowing, which could unlock fiscal flexibility—a point of contention in the previous SPD-led coalition. Trust between Merz and Scholz has eroded, particularly after Merz’s controversial decision in January 2025 to pass a non-binding migration motion with AfD support, breaching Germany’s postwar “firewall” against far-right cooperation. Scholz publicly declared he “can’t trust” Merz, and SPD leaders like Katja Mast have questioned his suitability to lead. This rift could complicate coalition talks, with the SPD potentially leveraging its position as Merz’s only realistic two-party partner to demand significant concessions, such as retaining key ministries or pushing progressive social policies that clash with Merz’s rightward shift on migration and economics. Whereas, a “Black-Green” coalition between the CDU-CSU (180 seats) and the Greens (76-88 seats) offers another two-party possibility, totaling 256-268 seats—again falling short of 316 but potentially viable with adjustments from final counts or a minority government toleration arrangement. This coalition has precedent at the state level in three German Länder but would be novel federally.
Verily, German election hath birthed not merely a parliament, but a crucible wherein the mettle of a statesman shall be proved; and so, with steely resolve and burdened heart, Merz must bend the discordant wills of a divided realm to forge a government worthy of a nation poised at destiny’s edge—for in this fragmented chorus, the harmony of leadership alone shall quell the gathering storm.
There is some ideological overlap, notably on foreign policy and defense, with both parties critical of Scholz’s hesitancy on Ukraine. Merz’s willingness to discuss coalitions with the Greens suggests openness, and their combined voter bases could appeal to a broad center-right and environmentally conscious electorate. The Greens’ pragmatic wing might compromise on economic growth priorities, aligning with Merz’s focus on deregulation and tax cuts. Significant hurdles arise from policy divergences. Merz’s hardline stance on migration—promising border closures on day one—contrasts sharply with the Greens’ pro-immigration platform, which deems such measures illegal under EU law. The CSU’s Markus Söder has categorically rejected a Green partnership, citing irreconcilable differences on climate and economic policy, where the Greens prioritize sustainability over Merz’s growth-first agenda. This internal CDU/CSU tension, coupled with the Greens’ weakened bargaining power post-election, makes this coalition less likely without major concessions—potentially alienating Merz’s conservative base. Another Coalition Option is CDU-CSU + SPD + FDP. A three-party “Germany Coalition” (black-red-yellow) combining the CDU/CSU (180 seats), SPD (103 seats), and FDP (assuming it secures 32+ seats with 5%) could reach 315-317 seats, just scraping a majority. This mirrors coalitions from Merkel’s second term and aligns with FDP leader Christian Lindner’s preference for a CDU/CSU partnership. The FDP’s free-market stance complements Merz’s economic vision, and Lindner’s past role as finance minister could smooth fiscal negotiations. The SPD’s inclusion ensures broader legitimacy, and all three parties share a pro-European, transatlantic outlook. Merz has suggested this could work if the FDP’s polling rises to 6-7%, stabilizing the coalition’s numbers. The FDP’s uncertain electoral fate is a wildcard—if it falls below 5%, this option collapses. Even if successful, the coalition risks instability, as seen in Scholz’s collapsed “traffic light” coalition (SPD, Greens, FDP). The FDP’s rigid defense of the debt brake clashes with SPD and CDU/CSU’s openness to reform, and Merz’s rightward pivot might strain relations with the SPD’s left-leaning base. Negotiations would be protracted, delaying governance at a time of economic and security crises. Meanwhile, a “Black-Blue” coalition with the AfD (180 + 126-132 = 306-312 seats) could theoretically approach a majority, especially with overhang seats. Merz’s January 2025 flirtation with AfD votes on migration policy sparked speculation about this possibility. Numerically, it’s close, and the AfD’s anti-immigration stance aligns with Merz’s recent rhetoric. Some conservative voters and analysts suggest this could normalize the AfD, reflecting a broader European trend of far-right inclusion (e.g., Italy, Netherlands). This option is politically untenable. Merz and the CDU-CSU have repeatedly ruled out governing with the AfD, which is monitored by German intelligence for extremism. The backlash to Merz’s migration vote—condemned by Scholz, Merkel, and civil society—underscored the taboo’s resilience. A dozen CDU lawmakers defected in a subsequent vote, signaling an internal revolt. Public opinion remains overwhelmingly opposed (66% per ARD polls), and such a move would fracture the CDU, alienate centrists, and destabilize Germany’s democratic consensus. Interestingly, a “Kenya Coalition” (black-green-red) with the CDU/CSU (180), Greens (76-88), and SPD (103) totals 359-371 seats, comfortably exceeding 316. It reflects the parties’ flag colors and addresses fragmentation. This ensures a robust majority, uniting major centrist forces against the AfD’s rise. Policy compromises could balance Merz’s economic goals with Green and SPD social priorities, leveraging their state-level cooperation experience. Ideological tensions—migration, climate, economics—make this a “coalition of last resort.” The CDU/CSU prefers two-party stability, and the Greens-SPD rift with Merz’s conservatism could lead to infighting, echoing the traffic light coalition’s demise. Negotiations would be arduous, delaying urgent action.
Merz’s most likely path is the Grand Coalition with the SPD, balancing feasibility with stability, though it risks reinforcing stagnation over bold reform. The Black-Green option, while innovative, faces internal and ideological barriers, particularly Söder’s veto. Three-party coalitions (Germany or Kenya) offer numerical security but threaten dysfunction, as recent history warns. The AfD option, while mathematically possible, is a political non-starter, exposing Merz’s rightward gamble as a strategic misstep that alienated allies without delivering gains. Merz’s challenge is compounded by his own actions—his AfD dalliance damaged trust, narrowing his options just as Germany needs decisive leadership amid economic decline and European uncertainty. The fragmented Bundestag reflects a broader crisis of consensus, and Merz’s coalition choice will test whether he can reconcile his conservative instincts with the pragmatic centrism Germany’s system demands. Without a clear majority partner, his chancellorship may begin weakened, underscoring the limits of his electoral triumph. Thus, as the tumultuous winds of the German federal election of 2025 subside, Friedrich Merz standeth upon the precipice of power, his gaze fixed upon a fractured Bundestag where no single banner doth wave triumphant. With the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian kin poised to claim nigh on 180 seats, the laurels of victory seem within grasp, yet the sceptre of governance eludeth still, for the requisite 316 doth loom as a distant summit. In this grand theatre of discord, where the far-right doth rise and the old guard wane, Merz must weave a fragile tapestry of alliance—be it through the storied halls of the Grand Coalition with a humbled Social Democratic Party, or the uncharted paths of a Black-Green union, shadowed by dissent within his own ranks. The tempests of ideology and the spectres of past missteps, not least his dalliance with forbidden flames, do rend asunder the trust once held, leaving him to tread a narrow causeway betwixt ambition and necessity. Verily, German election hath birthed not merely a parliament, but a crucible wherein the mettle of a statesman shall be proved; and so, with steely resolve and burdened heart, Merz must bend the discordant wills of a divided realm to forge a government worthy of a nation poised at destiny’s edge—for in this fragmented chorus, the harmony of leadership alone shall quell the gathering storm.